










João M P de Mello 
 
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO
DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA 
www.econ.puc-rio.brRepeated Lending under Contractual Incompleteness∗
Vinicius Carrasco and João M P De Mello†
December 2008
Abstract
We consider a model of repeated (relationship) lending in which some contingencies that are relevant
for a bank’s decision to ﬁnance a project cannot be described contractually. The hazards related to
this lack of contractibility can be magniﬁed by actions taken by an entrepreneur. The continuation
value of a lending relationship induces borrowers to take actions that minimize the ex-post conﬂict of
interests resulting from contractual incompleteness. The optimal lending relationship is stationary on
the equilibrium path. A robust feature of an optimal lending relationship is that the action schedule
(as a function of project types) adopted by the entrepreneur is either a constant or a step function.
Hence, the bank imposes to the entrepreneur a ﬁnite set of decisions from which he can pick his action,
bounding his discretion over decisions. This leads to lower interest rates charged by the bank and to
eﬃcient reﬁnancing in a lending relationship when compared to arm’s length ﬁnancing.
KEYWORDS: Relational Lending, Contractual Incompleteness, Repeated Games with Asymmetric
Information.
JEL CODES: C73, G21, D82.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Repeated lender-borrower interaction, often shorthanded as Relational Lending, is viewed as a major tech-
nology to produce loans. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that relationships are valuable for diﬀerent
types of borrowers. Berger and Udell [1995] and Petersen and Rajan [1994] document that small ﬁrms with
established banking relationships have more and better access to bank credit. Close bank-ﬁrm ties are per-
vasive in several ﬁnancial systems such as the Japanese Main Bank and the German Universal Bank systems
(Baums [1995]; Aoki at el [1995]). Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein [1991] document that large ﬁrms with
close ties to banks face less diﬃculty in raising capital than those without banking relationships.
Besides the empirical evidence, a full understanding of relational lending has become particularly impor-
tant in light of the recent subprime crisis. Although the academic literature has yet to produce a full account
of events, excessive disintermediation is one likely culprit. Splitting the roles of origination and lending may
have lowered the quality of underwriting. Fragmentation of creditors reduce the incentives to discipline
∗We would like to thank Antônio Carlos Sodré, and seminar participants at CEMFI’s MADMAC for comments and sugges-
tions. All errors are ours.
†Carrasco: Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio, vnc@econ.puc-rio.br. De Mello: Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio,
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1borrowers. The US banking system is already mutating towards an Universal Banking structure where in-
vestment banking will lose importance. This is a movement towards more intermediation and, consequently,
ever increasing importance of relationships as lending technologies.
Our contribution is to develop a theory of repeated lending in which relationships play a disciplinary
role. In the model, a wealth constrained entrepreneur has access to a project that, on top of some initial
funding, may need, with some probability, additional resources to go through. If these additional funds are
not provided, the project is shut down. Three interacting features make the provision of additional funds
non-trivial for the bank. First, the entrepreneur is privately informed about the probability of the project
going through without the need of more funds. Second, upon the project being granted more funds, its return
will depend on some non-contractible states. Third, and most important, the entrepreneur may take actions
that aﬀect the likelihood of his most preferred state in case he is granted more funds. Hence, contingencies
that are relevant for a bank’s decision to ﬁnance a project cannot be described contractually, and the hazards
related to the lack of contractibility may be magniﬁed by actions taken by an entrepreneur.
When the bank and the entrepreneur interact just once (arm’s length ﬁnancing), the bank mitigates the
hazards related to contractual incompleteness by oﬀering two diﬀerent contracts to the entrepreneur. In the
ﬁrst contract, only the initial funds are provided. The second contract prescribes the provision of additional
funds (a credit line), but the entrepreneur is charged an up-front premium for these funds. One interpretation
is that, given the lack of contractibility of some states, the provision of additional funds to the entrepreneur
grants him control over relevant decisions. Anticipating that the entrepreneur will take actions that goes
against its interests, the bank charges up-front for such a delegation of control. Given these two contracts,
diﬀerent "types" of entrepreneurs will sort themselves. If the likelihood of the project going through is high,
the entrepreneur will pick the ﬁrst contract. Therefore, projects that would be reﬁnanced in a world of
contractual completeness will be shut down with positive probability under arm’s length ﬁnancing.
In a lending relationship, the bank and the entrepreneur interact repeatedly, and the former may condition
future play on the latter’s current behavior. The continuation values of a relationship induce borrowers to take
actions that are more favorable to the lender. This alignment of parties’ interests reduces the ineﬃciencies
related to the lack of contractibility.1
In spite of the complexity of a setting in which the players’ interact repeatedly and one of them (the
borrower) has private information and takes non-contractible actions, we fully characterize the optimal
lending relationship. In fact, the optimal lending relationship takes a surprisingly simple form. We ﬁrst
show that, along the equilibrium path, the optimal lending relationship is stationary: at each period and for
every history of events that happens with positive probability in equilibrium, the entrepreneur is promised
the highest possible continuation value. In other words, for any two actions, a1 and a2, t a k e nw i t hp o s i t i v e
1The repeated dimension of relationship is a substitute to the “hands-on” monitoring done, for example, by Japanese banks.
In the banking literature, relationships are considered a technology to produce three types of monitoring: ex-ante, interim and
ex-post (Aoki and Dinç [2000]). Ex-ante monitoring, or screening, solves hidden information (adverse selection) problems. By
interacting repeatedly with borrowers, lenders learn relevant borrower (persistent) private information. Interim monitoring
refers to the ability that relational banks may have in inﬂuencing borrowers’ decisions in the making. By holding equity and
control stake, Japanese and German bankers are able to aﬀect decisions directly (Baums [1995]). In the small ﬁrm context,
privileged access to detailed transactions account information allows banks that interact repeatedly with borrowers to better
access their ﬁnancial status before things get out of control (Mester, Nakamura and Renault [2004]). Finally, ex-post monitoring
refers to veriﬁcation after the fact, i.e., after the relevant decision have been made. Most ex-post monitoring occurs in situations
of ﬁnancial distress, when the net worth of the ﬁrm (or the project) is not veriﬁable.
2likelihood2, the entrepreneur will be promised the same continuation value, v(a1)=v(a2).O ﬀ-equilibrium,
i.e. whenever the entrepreneur takes actions that are not prescribed to be taken, he is promised the lowest
continuation value, which is the value associated with the indeﬁnite repetition of arm’s length contracting.
Such punishment guarantees that the entrepreneur will stick the course of action implicitly agreed by the
relationship.
Our second result is that all projects are reﬁnanced if the entrepreneur is patient. Along with the fact
that on the equilibrium path the entrepreneur is promised the highest possible continuation values at each
period, this implies that the implicit contract between the lender and the entrepreneur satisﬁes a strong
form of renegotiation-proofness: current (as all projects are reﬁnanced) as well as future (as only the highest
continuation value is promised to the entrepreneur) eﬃciency is attained.
As repetition aligns the bank’s and the entrepreneur’s incentives, it is not so surprising that reﬁnancing is
granted to all projects. What is surprising is the form by which the alignment of interests take. Indeed, we
show that, at an optimal lending relationship, the action schedule (as a function of project types) adopted
by the entrepreneur is either a constant or a step function. Therefore, the entrepreneur refrains (at least
partly when the schedule is a step function) from using his private information in deciding which action to
pursue in an optimal lending relationship. One can interpret this result as saying that the bank imposes to
the entrepreneur a ﬁnite set of decisions from which he can pick his action. This bounds the entrepreneur’s
discretion over decisions, minimizing the ex-post conﬂicts of interest.
The reason why it is optimal to restrict the entrepreneur’s discretion is straightforward. As argued
above, the bank charges up-front whenever the entrepreneur exercises (and abuses) the control granted by
the provision of funds. If he chooses actions that do not depend on the project types, the entrepreneur
refrains from exercising (abusing) control. As the entrepreneur abstains from using his private information
when taking actions (and also ends up picking actions that are closer to the bank’s preferred one in a
lending relationship), the repayment (premium) asked by the bank is smaller than under arm’s length
ﬁnancing. Absent long-term engagements, borrower and lender interests are misaligned, and credit would
be prohibitively expensive in situations in which reﬁnancing is eﬃcient.
In contrast to our paper, learning private information from borrowers is behind most rationales for rela-
tionships in the literature. By interacting repeatedly, lenders acquire (borrower’s) private information about
ex-ante identical borrowers, which is valuable to lend in subsequent periods. Sharpe [1990], Petersen and
Rajan [1995], Rajan [1992] and Boot and Thakor [2000] all share this feature. Dynamics only play a role
insofar as information is revealed over time. If all private information about borrowers could be acquired by
lending once, relations would be maintained only if information is kept private to the relationship. Therefore,
the explanation based on hidden information hinges on the emergence of an ex-post informational monopoly:
relationships are valuable insofar as the acquired private information remains private to the initial lender
(Aoki and Dinç [2000]).3
Much as in Boot and Thakor [2000], we show that competition does not harm relationship lending. In
their paper, relationship loaning involves the bank adding value to a project through costly investment in
specialization. The possibility of adding value diﬀerentiates the relational bank from other loaners, and is
2This means that there exist project types θ1 and θ2 for which the entrepreneur takes, respectively, actions a1 and a2 in
equilibrium.
3Rajan [1992] explicitly models this trade-oﬀ, and relational lending (informed lending in his words) is costly because rent
extraction by the bank dampens borrowers’ incentive to exert eﬀort.
3a source of surplus to the bank which remains beneﬁcial under competition. In our model, in contrast,
the value generated by a relationship comes fully from its disciplining eﬀect on the borrower. Competition
among banks transfer the eﬃciency gains brought up by the relationship to the entrepreneur, which makes
his implicit commitment to the relationship more credible.
There are some other papers that hints at disciplining explanations for relationship lending. In both
Stiglitz and Weiss [1983] and Bolton and Scharfstein [1990], future lending prospects induce truth-telling on
early period’s proﬁt realization and, consequently, assures that the ﬁnancier recoups the funds provided. Our
paper, however, is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in terms of the contractual implications of a long-term relationship.
In both papers, as in most “screening” models, an optimal long-term ﬁnancing relationship calls for interim
ineﬃciencies: whenever the borrower reports low proﬁts, lenders “punish” by denying credit in the subsequent
period. In our model, relationships arise exactly to overcome such ineﬃciencies, which are avoided through
the endogenous commitment of the entrepreneur to not act against the bank.
In an inﬁnitely repeated moral hazard game, Boot and Thakor [1994] study the intertemporal use of
collateral in a competitive credit market. In their setting, the use of collateral is an ineﬃcient way to
induce an entrepreneur to exert eﬀort that increases the likelihood of success of a project. Assuming lenders
only need to break-even intertemporally (not every period), repetition and collateral become substitutes
as mechanisms to align incentives: banks’ ability to commit to a promise of better future contracts makes
collateral less necessary to induce entrepreneurs’ high eﬀort. In our model, intertemporal use of collateral
plays no role. Therefore, our theory also applies to empirical settings in which borrowers have little or no
assets to set aside as collateral, such as the small ﬁrm credit market, or angel and venture capital ﬁnancing.
More importantly, in their paper, the lenders’ ability to commit to better future contracts is crucial. In our
set-up there is no need for long-term explicit contracts to be written. Also, in our model, banks are assumed
to break-even period by period.
Our work also relates to (a more general) literature on repeated contracting. Athey et al [2005], for
example, show that a privately informed monetary authority chooses, in certain states, a monetary policy
that is unresponsive to the state of the economy. In our paper, actions are insensitive to private information
for all possible parameter values and realizations of state. Full discretion — a static best response — while
sometimes is optimal for a (positive probability) set of states in their model, is never optimal in ours. The
force behind non-discretion in their paper — the log-concavity of the distribution of shocks — is also present
in our model, but here there is an additional and more important force pushing towards ignoring private
information. By reducing the probability of the entrepreneur’s preferred (non-contractible) state, an action
schedule that is invariant to the entrepreneur’s private information reduces the interest rate on reﬁnancing
irrespective of distributional assumptions. This additional and new force suggests that it may be optimal
for the entrepreneur to refrain from using its private information when choosing her actions even if the
distribution of states is not log-concave.
Methodologically, we borrow from Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (henceforth APS) [1990] the tools to solve
for the set of Public Pure Strategy (PPS) Equilibria of the game played by a bank and an entrepreneur.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the primitives of the model. Section 3 characterizes
the equilibrium in the static game. Section 4 characterizes the best lending relationship. The analysis is split
in two. In subsection 4.3, we consider the case in which the borrower is arbitrarily patient. In subsection
4.4, the case of an impatient borrower is considered. Section 5 concludes.
42S e t - U p : T h e S t a g e G a m e
We consider a setting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur has access to an indivisible project but lacks
resources to fund it. There is a large number of risk neutral lenders, called banks, who have the means to
ﬁnance the project, and compete among themselves to do so. The project needs I0 > 0 to be started. If




⊂ [0,1],w h e r e
θ is close to zero and θ is close to 1. The entrepreneur is assumed to be privately informed about such
probability. From the banks’ perspective, θ is distributed according to a log-concave distribution F(θ),w i t h
density f(θ) > 0.
With probability 1 − θ, the project needs additional funding I1 > 0 to go through. If I1 is not provided,
the project is shut down and yields zero in revenues. In case the funds are provided, the project succeeds
with certainty but its exact return depends on the realization of a non-contractible state of nature. There
a r et w op o s s i b l es t a t e s ,E and F. In state E, the project yields RE, while in state F it yields RF.
We assume that both returns are not contractible, and that RE fully accrues to the entrepreneur, while
RF fully accrues to the banks. Although extreme, this assumption captures in the clearest way the ex-post
conﬂict of interests between the lender and the borrower arising from the lack of contractibility.
It is assumed throughout that
min{[1 − E (θ)]RE,[1 − E (θ)]RF} >I 1,
so that reﬁnancing is always eﬃcient, and that R is large enough so that the entrepreneur is able to use the
contractible return to “subsidize” any premium charged by the bank for the additional resources.4
The initial probability of state E is a ∈ (0,1). However, right after I0 is provided, the entrepreneur can, at
ac o s tc(a) —w i t hc(a)=c0 (a)=0 ,a n dc0(1) = ∞ —, take an action a ∈ [a,1] that increases the probability
of his most favorable state. Although a is observed by both the bank and the entrepreneur, it is assumed to
be non-observable by a third party (e.g., a court).
Real world examples of such type of action abound: extracting some of the project’s resources for private
beneﬁts, diverting resources from the project to other endeavors or to cover losses incurred somewhere else
are but a couple examples. Another popular example is excessive (from the banks’ perspective) risk-taking:
since an entrepreneur is the residual claimant of “upsides” in a project (while banks are the residual claimants
of “downsides”), he, against the bank’s will, can take decisions that increase the variability of a project’s
return.
For simplicity, we normalize the initial probability of E to satisfy
(1 − a)E [1 − θ]RF = I1. (A1)
This says that, if the status-quo actions is taken, reﬁnancing can be provided by the bank with no
additional premium. As will be clear shortly, none of the results to follow depend on such normalization.
The entrepreneur and the bank can contract on whether the initial funds, I0, are provided, and on the
payment, D, to be paid by the entrepreneur to the bank in case the project yields R. The parties can also
contract on whether the ﬁnancier will reﬁnance the entrepreneur. This decision, however, can neither be
4We also implicitly assume that the bank who provides the initial funds have an speciﬁc (unmodeled) contribution to the
project that makes the return RF non-transferable to some other bank. This precludes the possibility of competion among the
banks for just the “second” part of the project.
5contingent on the states, nor on the ex-post returns due to their lack of veriﬁability. We model the reﬁnancing
decision by means of a variable x ∈ {0,1},w i t hx =1meaning that the additional funds will be granted.
An interpretation for x =1is that a credit line is advanced by the bank to the entrepreneur. A contract is
ap a i r{D,x}.
2.1 Timing of Events
The timing of the events of the stage game is as follows. At period zero, the banks post contracts of the
form {D,x}. In period 1, the entrepreneur learns θ, and picks a contract {D,x} from one of the banks.
The entrepreneur chooses which action to pursue in period 2. In period 3, if the project goes through,
that is, return R realizes, a payment of D is made to the bank according to the contract signed in period 1.
Otherwise, the relevant state is learned. The reﬁnancing decision is given by what was agreed by the period
1 contract.
2.2 The Repeated Game
The entrepreneur and one particular bank can interact repeatedly over time, t, which runs from zero to
inﬁnity. At each period t, they play the stage game described above with the project’s quality, θt, being
drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from F(.). Since there is a large number of identical banks, we keep assuming that
banks will — given their correct expectations about the entrepreneur’s type — exactly break-even in every
period t.
We make this assumption because, if any, the gains generated by a relationship will be solely implied
by its disciplinary eﬀect on the borrower. Hence, those gains do not depend on the bank’s identity, which
suggests that competition among banks in period zero for the relational/implicit contract with the lender
would drive their expected proﬁts to zero. All the results in the paper go through if the bank is granted any
constant level of per period proﬁts.
3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Static Game
As it is widely known since Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976], a competitive model in which ﬁrms compete for
customers with private information does not admit a pooling equilibrium in general. Hence, a situation in
which either all projects are given additional funds, or in which neither of projects are granted funds cannot
prevail as part of an equilibrium in the stage game.5
The only possibility, therefore, is that two contracts are oﬀered in equilibrium: one that prescribes reﬁ-
nancing and the other which does not. They take the form of {D,1},a n d{D,0}, with D>D ,w h e r es u c h
repayments guarantee, given its (correct) expectations, zero proﬁts for the bank in each contract:
DE(θ|x =1 )+E [(1 − θ)(1 − a(θ))|x =1 ]RF = I0 + I1,
and
DE (θ|x =0 )=I0.
5In fact, a pooling equilibrium in which all projects are reﬁnanced cannot hold if for some projects the need of reﬁnancing
is suﬃciently unlikely, that is, if θ is close to 1. A pooling equilibrium in which no projects are reﬁnanced does not exist if the
need of reﬁnancing is suﬃciently high for some projects, that is, if θ is close to zero.





such that, if θ ≥ θ
∗, the second contract is
chosen by the entrepreneur, while the ﬁrst contract is picked otherwise. This equilibrium implies that only
if the entrepreneur pays a suﬃciently high amount to the bank he has access to a credit line. This follows
because the entrepreneur takes actions that go against the bank’s interests if those funds are provided. The
premium charged ex-ante, in turn, will preclude the re-ﬁnancing of some projects as the entrepreneur will
only be willing to pay the premium when projects are more likely to need reﬁnancing.
For the sake of comparison with the next sections, one should note that, whenever granted a credit line,
the entrepreneur will use his private information — the value of θ —i nan o nt r i v i a lw a yw h e nc h o o s i n gt h e
action to take. More speciﬁcally, in period 2, the entrepreneur solves
max
a∈[0,1]
(1 − θ)aRE − c(a).
Denote by aNE(θ) the unique solution of this problem. Clearly, aNE(θ) is continuous. Moreover, since
the objective function has increasing diﬀerences in (a,−θ) and the solution is interior, aNE(θ) is strictly
decreasing in θ (Topkis [1998]). Hence, the higher the likelihood of reﬁnancing being needed, the more the
entrepreneur will act against the bank’s interest.
4 Relationship Lending
4.1 Preliminaries: Strategies and Payoﬀs
Throughout a relationship, both the entrepreneur and the bank can condition present behavior (e.g., whether
reﬁnancing is provided) on what has been observed in the past. Using this observation, we model a lending
relationship as a Public Pure Equilibrium (PPE) of the repeated game played by both parties.
To deﬁne strategies and the players’ payoﬀ in the repeated game, we need to establish what is publicly
observed by the parties. A public history of length 1 (the initial history), h0, is just the empty set. For
t>0, a public history of length t, ht, is a sequence of




2. actions {∅,a 1,...,at−1} taken by the entrepreneur, and, ﬁnally,
3. outcomes of a public random device observed before the players act at each stage of the game,
{∅,  1,..., t−1}, which serve the purpose of convexifying the set of equilibrium payoﬀsi nt h er e -
peated game.
At each period t, the bank and the entrepreneur observe a history ht, and can condition their current and
future behavior on ht.L e t t i n g Ht be the set of all possible public histories of length t,as t r a t e g yf o rt h e
entrepreneur is a sequence of functions {at(.)}∞
t=1,w h e r e ,f o re a c ht,
at : Ht × [θ,θ] → <.
A strategy for the Bank is a sequence of contracts to be oﬀered where, for each t, the contract oﬀered is
a function of the history ht.6
6Banks not engaged in a relationship with the borrower will oﬀer the arm’s length contract at every ht and all t in equilibrium.
7At period t, given the the contract {Dt,x t} picked and the action taken, at, the entrepreneur’s instanta-
neous utility is given by
ut(at,D t,x t;θ)=θt(R − Dt)+( 1− θt)xtatRE − c(at).






The entrepreneur’s and the bank’s strategies deﬁne a probability distribution over public histories in the










where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distribution induced by the strategy proﬁles.
4.2 Computing the Set of PPE’s Payoﬀ
4.2.1 A Recursive Formulation
We solve this game by applying the recursive methods developed by Abreu [1988] and Abreu, Pearce and
Stachetti [1990]. More speciﬁcally, letting V ⊂ < be the set of Public Pure Equilibria (PPE) Payoﬀsf o rt h e
entrepreneur7,a n yv in V can be written as
v = E[(1 − δ)u(a,D,x;θ)+δv(a)],
where v(a) ∈ V for all a ∈ <.
In words, any PPE can be summarized by a set of period 1 contracts {D,x}x∈{0,1},a na c t i o na to be
taken in the initial period, and promised continuation values, v(a), w h i c hd e p e n do nt h ea c t i o nt a k e na n d
incorporates all relevant aspects of the future play between the entrepreneur and the bank.
We search for the best lending relationship, that is, the action a, the contract {D,x}x∈{0,1} , and contin-
uation values that solve
max
{D,x}x∈{0,1},a,{v(a0)}a0∈<
E [(1 − δ)u(a,D,x;θ)+δv(a)] (Program)
subject to
(1 − δ)u(a,D,x;θ)+δv(a) ≥ (1 − δ)u(a0,D,x;θ)+δv(a0) for all a0, (IC)
v(a0) ∈ V for all a0, (Feasibility)
and
This guarantees that borrowers will not abandon their relational bank, i.e., they will not deviate and try to start a relationship
with another bank. Also, oﬀering the arm’s length contract is, given the strategies of the other players, optimal for the banks
not engaged in the lending relationship.
7This set is not empty as the inﬁnite repetition of the actions taken in the static game constitutes a PPE equilibrium.
8D =
(
D if x =1
D if x =0
, (Zero-Proﬁt)
where D satisﬁes
DE(θ|x =1 )+E [(1 − θ)(1 − a(θ))|x =1 ]RF = I0 + I1,
while D satisﬁes
D E(θ|x =0 )=I0.
The ﬁrst constraint states that the prescribed action is incentive compatible given continuation values
v(.). The second constraint calls for continuation values v(a0) being PPE values for any action a0.T h el a s t
constraint is the zero-proﬁt condition for the bank.
Toward solving (Program), and following Athey et al [2004], it is useful to decompose the incentive
compatibility constraints into two diﬀerent sets of constraints. An entrepreneur with project θ can think










is not prescribed to be taken on the equilibrium path.
The Incentive Compatibility constraints in (IC) can be then equivalently written as




), for all θ,b θ (IC1)





(1 − δ)u(a(θ),D,x;θ)+δv(a(θ)) ≥ (1 − δ)u(a0,D,x;θ)+δv(a0). (IC2)










4.2.2 Properties of the Set of PPE Values
We now derive some important properties of the set of equilibrium payoﬀs, V.
For a given set W ⊂ R, consider the following operator
T(W)=
(
v| there exists {D,x}x∈{0,1}, {a(θ)}θ ,a n d{w(a)}a∈< ⊂ W, satisfying the restrictions (IC1), (IC2),
the Zero-Proﬁt condition in Program, and so that v = Eθ[(1 − δ)u(a(θ),D,x;θ)+δw(a(θ))]
.
Following APS’s jargon, a v in T(W) is said to be enforceable by W. APS [1990] have shown that the set
of PPE’s Payoﬀ is given by the largest ﬁxed point of this operator; i.e., the V that satisﬁes T(V )=V and
so that, for all other Ω with T(Ω)=Ω, Ω ⊂ V.
A slight complication arises because our setting diﬀers from the one in APS in an important dimension:
the actions taken by the entrepreneur lie in a continuous set. In order to argue that a maximum for (Program)
exists, we need to show that T(.) takes compact sets into compact sets.
We use the particular structure of the constraints implied by T(.), the similarity of those constraints with
the ones arising in standard static mechanism design problems, and the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ to do so.
We start with the following result, which is derived from an application of the Envelope Theorem (Milgrom
and Segal, [2002]) to the Incentive Compatibility constraints implied by (IC1)
9Lemma 1 (IC Representation) Fix a set W ⊂ <. Any v in T (W) can be written as
v = Eθ[(1 − δ)u(a(θ),D,x;θ)+δw(a(θ))]











where xa(θ) is non-increasing in θ.
Using the IC Representation Lemma, we can show the following result
Lemma 2 (T (.) preserves compactness) T (.) takes compact sets into compact sets.
As shown by [1990], an immediate implication of the fact that the operator T (.) preserves compactness
is that the set of PPE values V , which is the largest ﬁxed point of T (.), is itself compact. We then have
Proposition 1 Among all PPE payoﬀs, there exists a smallest payoﬀ, v,a n dal a r g e s tp a y o ﬀ, v. Hence,
there exists a solution for (Program).
We can now fully characterize the (implicit) contract that leads to the best lending relationship between
t h ee n t r e p r e n e u ra n dt h eb a n k . T h ef o r mo ft h i sc o n tract will depend on the entrepreneur’s degree of
patience. We ﬁrst analyze the case in which the entrepreneur is patient (δ is large, potentially approaching
1) and then we move to the case in which his discount rate is strictly smaller than one.
4.3 The Case of a Patient Entrepreneur
Along the repeated interaction, when considering deviations from the behavior speciﬁed in an equilibrium,




prescribed for a project of
quality b θ when, in fact, if the true quality of the project is θ, he must take a(θ). S u c had e v i a t i o nw o u l d
never be detected by the bank. Consequently, the constraints in (IC1) have to be taken into account no
matter what the entrepreneur’s discount rate is.
Second, she could take an action which is not prescribed to be taken in equilibrium for any possible
project quality; that is an action a/ ∈ a([θ,θ]). Such a deviation is detectable by the bank. Moreover, it is
always optimal to make use of the harshest possible punishment to induce a non-deviating behavior from
the entrepreneur (Abreu [1988]).
This last observation suggests that, when δ is suﬃciently large, the constraints in (IC2) will not be binding.
To see that this is indeed the case, consider, for instance, the punishment induced by Nash Reversal8.L e t t i n g
V NE be the stage game Nash (expected) payoﬀ, v(a(θ)) be the continuation value prescribed by the best
PPE when the entrepreneur has project θ and takes the corresponding action takes the action a(θ),a n da0
any action which is not in a([θ,θ]). One has that, for all such a0 and for all θ,
δ
1 − δ
[v(a(θ))) − V NE] ≥ u(a0,D;θ) − u(a(θ),D;θ),∀θ
when δ is large and if v(a(θ))) >VNE.
8That is, the reversion to playing the static Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium indeﬁnitely following an observable deviation by
the entrepreneur. Since he has the option of searching for other banks (arm’s length ﬁnancing), this is the worst punishment
that can be inﬂicted on the entrepreneur.
10We show below that the best lending relationship prescribes, along the equilibrium path, continuation
values that are higher than static Nash values for all projects, that is
v(a(θ)) >VNE for all θ.
Hence, when the entrepreneur is suﬃciently patient, we can safely ignore the constraints in (IC2).
We now argue that the optimal lending relationship will be such that reﬁnancing is provided for all
projects. The reason for that is simple. Whenever feasible, it will be optimal to reﬁnance all projects. In
fact, since at each period the bank has zero proﬁts, the entrepreneur is the residual claimant of the total
surplus. As it is eﬃcient to provide reﬁnancing to all projects, and the best lending relationship maximizes
the entrepreneur’s ex-ante (i.e., before the realization of the project’s quality) payoﬀ,i ti so p t i m a lf o rt h e
entrepreneur to have all projects reﬁnanced.
If reﬁnancing is prescribed for all projects in a lending relationship, an entrepreneur who faces a project
with high probability of going through without the need of reﬁnancing, could be tempted to deviate and seek
for lower repayments under arm’s length ﬁnancing. Such deviation, however, will be punished with arm’s
length ﬁnancing for all future periods. Therefore, upon deviating, the entrepreneur’s expected future payoﬀ
will be V NE. Hence, the deviation is unproﬁtable if the discount factor is suﬃciently high.
Proposition 2 There exists a δ<1 such that, if δ ≥ δ, reﬁnancing is provided to all projects at an optimal
lending relationship.
Reﬁnancing to all projects is one of the main features of relational lending in our model: repeated
interaction between the entrepreneur and a bank arises exactly to curb the ineﬃciencies — lack of reﬁnancing
for some projects — related to a single interaction.
We have argued above that to satisfy (IC2), it is optimal to use the harshest possible punishment, V NE,




. We now consider how the constraints in (IC1)




. To make the
analysis, it is convenient to think of an equivalent formulation of the problem in which the entrepreneur
reports his project type, θ, to the bank that, given the report, suggests an action to be taken by the by the
entrepreneur.
If the optimal lending relationship prescribes diﬀerent actions for diﬀerent project types, continuation
values must vary to provide incentives. As an example, suppose that the lending relationship calls for an
action schedule which is, at the same type, smaller than aNE(θ) (the action taken in the one-shot game), and
strictly downward sloping. In such case, an entrepreneur who announces a higher type (i.e., takes a lower
action) must be rewarded through higher continuation values. Analogously, if the entrepreneur announces a
lower type (i.e., takes a higher action), he must be promised lower continuation values.
This suggests that, along the equilibrium path, continuation values will play a key role if the lending
relationship calls for “separation” of diﬀerent projects, that is, the entrepreneur taking diﬀerent actions
whenever facing diﬀerent project types. It turns out, however, that at an optimum lending relationship calls
for diﬀerent projects being "pooled" together. This happens for two reasons.
To understand the ﬁrst reason, it is useful to consider the implications of the action schedule aNE(θ)
that prevails under arm’s length ﬁnancing. In an one shot interaction, the bank demands a higher payment
to reﬁnance the project because of its needs to recoup the losses associated with the low ex-post returns
11arising from projects with high probability of needing additional funds. Given a project type θ,t h eex-
ante probability the bank has to recoup money in case reﬁnancing is granted is (1 − θ)(1− aNE(θ)). Since
aNE(θ) is strictly decreasing and projects with lower θs are the ones seeking reﬁnancing, in expectation,
this probability ends up being small. In a repeated setting, the entrepreneur would like to reduce the bank’s
expected losses by increasing the likelihood of the ﬁnancier’s preferred state.
There are two ways in which this can be accomplished. The ﬁrst and more direct one is by taking an
action a(θ) which is smaller than the static optimal one for every project type θ. The second and more
interesting one is by taking an action which does not vary with θ. The interpretation is straightforward.
Given the lack of contractibility, the provision of additional funds to the entrepreneur grants him control
over relevant decisions. The bank charges up-front for such a delegation of control. The amount charged is
higher the more the entrepreneur exercises control. By choosing actions that do not depend on the project
type, the entrepreneur refrains from doing it.
The second reason why the entrepreneur would like to refrain from adopting an action that depends on
the realized project, θ,i sab i tl e s si n t u i t i v e :f r o ma nex-ante perspective, the entrepreneur puts a higher
weight on states for which she does not need reﬁnancing. Therefore, she takes actions which are closer to
the ones that are optimal for projects with high θs.
The formal description of both eﬀects are as follows. Using Lemma 1, the objective function of (1) reads,





























+ E (θ)[R − D]
¸
,
where D i st h ep a y m e n tt h a ts o l v e s
DE(θ)+E [(1 − θ)(1− a(θ))]RF = I0 + I1.







dθ is, for example, positive. Incentive compatibility
then requires that
da(θ)
dθ < 0 for all θ over this interval.9 Consider replacing a(θ) by its expected value,
E [a(θ)|(θ∗,θ
∗)], over such interval. We argue that an improvement could be attained in two fronts.




∗),a n d(1 − θ) is decreasing,
E [(1 − θ)(1− a(θ))|θ∗,θ
∗]RF
<E [(1 − θ)]|(θ∗,θ
∗)[1− E [a(θ)|(θ∗,θ
∗)]]RF.10
This last inequality says that the replacement of a(θ) by E (a(θ)|(θ∗,θ
∗)) in (θ∗,θ
∗) increases the like-
lihood of the states in which the bank recoup some money in case reﬁnancing is provided. This, in turn,
implies that the required repayment D will be smaller, which will lead to gains. Note that a lower repayment
made to the bank is beneﬁcial to all project types. Therefore, the gains we just derived do not rely on any
distributional assumption on the types of projects.









9In the appendix, we consider the case in which v (.) is not diﬀerentiable.





















Hence, the replacement of a(θ) by E (a(θ)|(θ∗,θ
∗)) in (θ∗,θ







As the action prescribed for project θ was not aﬀected, if the proposed change is feasible, it increases the
objective. Feasibility calls for existing continuation values in V that guarantee that the change is incentive
compatible. In the Appendix, we show that one can indeed ﬁnd continuation values in V that guarantee
that the proposed change is Incentive Compatible.
This discussion suggests that, on the equilibrium path, v(a(θ)) should be constant at an optimum. Among
the constant continuation values, the best one is the highest.11 We then haven
Proposition 3 At an optimum of (Program),
v(a)=
(









The result shows that, on the equilibrium path, an optimal lending relationship is stationary. Along with
t h ef a c tt h a tr e ﬁnancing is granted to all project types, Proposition 3 implies that the implicit contract
between the lender and the entrepreneur satisﬁes a strong form of renegotiation-proofness: current (as
all projects are reﬁnanced) as well as future (as only the highest continuation value is promised to the
entrepreneur) eﬃciency is attained. This is in sharp contrast to "screening" models in which some sort of
relationship drives lending (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein [1990]).
Using Proposition 3, v can be expressed as























+ E (θ)[R − D]
¸¸
, (P2)
subject to a(θ) being incentive compatible, and D guaranteeing zero proﬁts for the bank.
11Continuation values that do not depend on announcements are also optimal in Athey et al (2005), and Maggi and Morelli
(2006). In Athey et al (2005), logconcavity is the (only) force leading to such a result. In our setting, an additional and particular
force is present: an implicit contract that uses type dependent continuation values induces too a high of contractible repayment
from the entrepreneur to the bank (i.e., too high of an interest rate). This eﬀect holds true for all possible distributions so
that the above result is likely to hold in our setting even for distributions which are not log-concave as long as the repayment
demanded by the bank is large enough, which happens, for example, if RF and R are relatively low. In Maggi and Morelli’s
discrete type model, the result is a consequence of the particular structure that deﬁnes how a collective action is taken. In such
a structure, truthful reporting is never binding so continuation values are not needed to ensure truthtelling and, of course, it
does not pay to use continuation values other the highest ones for all states.
134.3.1 The Optimal Lending Relationship
Full characterization of the optimal lending relationship involves ﬁnding the action schedule that solves
(P2). When choosing the optimal schedule, one has to consider three eﬀects. The ﬁrst one is the eﬀect of
the schedule on the payment, D, to be made from the entrepreneur. The second is the eﬀect of the chosen








component of the objective, while the third eﬀect is on the utility of the entrepreneur when he has the
best possible project, θ.
In the previous section, we showed that the ﬁrst two eﬀects alone would lead to actions that do not
respond to the types of project that the entrepreneur faces. This, however, can potentially hurt type θ.
Hence, the optimal action schedule trades-oﬀ the eﬀect of the schedule on θ and the need for constancy.
There are a number of interesting cases in which it will be optimal to have a constant action. In fact, the
relevant condition on the parameters for that to happen is that
RE
£
θ − E (θ)
¤
≤ RF [1 − E (θ)]. (A2)

























Consider ﬁrst term B. As argued in the previous section, since for all non-increasing schedules one has
that
E [(1 − θ)(1− a(θ))]RF ≤ E [(1 − θ)]E [(1 − a(θ))]RF
(so that a constant action maximizes the likelihood of the banks most favorable states in case of reﬁnancing













term B is maximized by the choice of a constant action.
This constant action balances the negative impact of a higher action on the payment to be made to the
bank when the project succeeds, D,w i t ht h eb e n e ﬁt of higher informational rents. In other words, for term
(B), the relevant trade-oﬀ is between the premium for reﬁnancing charged by the bank and the informational
r e n t sf o rt y p e sb e l o wθ.








= RF [1 − E (θ)].








θ − E (θ)
¤
.
Under (A2), the marginal cost of a higher action is higher than the marginal beneﬁt, so the constant
action schedule that maximizes term B is a.









































the static best action for the entrepreneur when his project is θ.





















is not aﬀected, whereas a strict gain is brought up for the term






since a(θ) is closer to a (the action that maximizes this term) for a positive probability set of projects.
This discussion proves
Proposition 4 The best lending relationship when (A2) holds and δ is large is such that a(θ)=a for all θ,
where a satisﬁes
[1 − E (θ)][RE − RF] − c0 (a) ≤ 0,
with equality if a>a .
Under (A2), in spite of having control over the decisions to take, the entrepreneur completely refrains
from exercising it by committing to a single action irrespective of the quality of his project. Alternatively,
the bank completely eliminates the entrepreneur’s discretion over decisions, demanding him to take a given
action throughout the relationship.
A couple of interesting observations can be made using the inequality that characterizes the optimal action
under (A2). First, a<a NE¡
θ
¢
≤ aNE(θ) for all θ. In our model, a relationship generates an endogenous
commitment from the entrepreneur’s part to not act against the bank’s interest. In equilibrium, not only the
entrepreneur chooses an action schedule that does not respond to his private information but also commits
to an action which is smaller than his best static action for all possible types. As a consequence of such
commitment, the payment promised to the bank is
D(a)=
I0 + I1 − (1 − a)(1− E (θ))RF
E (θ)
,
which is smaller than the payment in the arm’s length ﬁnancing corresponding to the static equilibrium.
Second, if RE ≤ RF, the entrepreneur will choose the bank’s most preferred action, a. The interpretation
for this is straightforward. If RE ≤ RF, it is ineﬃcient to take actions that are higher than a. The repetition
of the game — which serves as a commitment device to the entrepreneur — along with the fact that a higher
15action would induce higher interest rates guarantee that the entrepreneur fully internalizes the ineﬃciency
costs associated with higher actions.
Al o wp r e m i u mf o rr e ﬁnancing is key in our relationship lending model. The disciplinary role of a
relationship allows for a more lenient credit line policy from the bank at an interest rate which is lower than
in the arm’s length market, which rationalizes the received evidence in empirical banking literature (Berger
and Udell [1995], for example). This is in contrast to learning explanations of relational lending in which
ﬁrms strong banking relationships do not necessarily have access to credit at lower interest rates.
We now brieﬂy discuss of some features of the optimal lending relationship when (A2) does not hold. In
this case, the solution is a bit more complicated. To understand why it is the case, it is worth considering




. Hence, the choice of an action schedule which is closer to 1 may signiﬁcantly harm the
utility of the entrepreneur when his type is θ. The balance between the type θ’s payoﬀ and the informational
rents component of the objective may therefore call for a non-constant action schedule.
While it is hard to make a full blown characterization of the optimal action schedule, it turns out that,
even when the forces that drive the optimal lending relationship toward the adoption of a single action
conﬂict with the type θ’s payoﬀ, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to refrain, at least to some degree, from
using its private information against the bank. More precisely, at optimal lending relationship, the action
schedule will be a step function.
Proposition 5 When (A2) does not hold, there exists a ﬁnite number of actions {ai}
N




into ﬁnite intervals {Ai}
N
i=1 such that, at an optimal lending relationship, a(θ)=ai if θ ∈ Ai.
Propositions 4 and 5 say that, at an optimal lending relationship under contractual incompleteness, the
bank imposes to the entrepreneur a ﬁnite set of decisions from which he can pick his action, restricting
substantially his discretion. The reduction in the entrepreneur’s discretion to take actions minimizes the
ex-post conﬂicts brought up by the contractual incompleteness.
4.4 The Case of an Impatient Entrepreneur
An impatient entrepreneur may be tempted, if asked to take an action that is too low given the realization
of the project, to renege on the implicit contract prescribed by the lending relationship and take a higher
action. In this section, we consider this possibility. We focus attention on the case in the temptation to
deviate is the greatest, namely, we consider a situation in which (A2) holds.12
To understand better the new forces at play, consider the entrepreneur’s incentives when facing a project
of quality θ, and being called to adopt action the action a<a NE¡
θ
¢
from Proposition 4. By deviating and
adopting the static best action, the entrepreneur’s immediate gain is13
[(1 − θ)REaNE(θ) − c(aNE(θ))] − [(1 − θ)REa − c(a)].
12We also assume that, although not inﬁnitely patient, the entrepreneur’s discount rate is so that it is feasible to have all
projects reﬁnanced.
13We focus on θ because, using the Envelope Theorem, the immediate gain from deviating as a function of θ is
RE

a − aNE (θ)

< 0.
16This deviation is punished in the harshest possible way by the bank. Given the fact that the entrepreneur
has the option of searching for other banks (arm’s length ﬁnancing), the worst punishment is the indeﬁnite
repetition of the static equilibrium for all periods after the deviation, i.e., V NE.
Therefore, observable deviations will not be deterred if, and only if
δ
1 − δ
[v − V NE] < [(1 − θ)REaNE(θ) − c(aNE(θ))] − [(1 − θ)REa − c(a)] (1)
where v is the expected discounted sum of the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ,a n da is the optimal constant action
under the relationship implied by Proposition 4.
Under (1), the lending relationship needs to adjust the required action upward to decrease the gains from
a deviation. This adjustment, however, has a perverse eﬀect. By moving the action adopted away from a,
the value of the lending relationship itself will fall, and this will reduce the perceived cost of a deviation.
The upward adjustment of the chosen action must then be made so to guarantee an exact equality between
the costs and beneﬁts that the entrepreneur faces when deviating. We now proceed to construct such an
adjustment.
For a given constant e a,d e ﬁne
V (e a) ≡
θ Z
θ
[θ[R − e D]+( 1− θ)(REe a − c(e a))]f(θ)dθ,
as the expected discounted value of a relationship when the constant action e a is adopted, where e D solves
E(θ) e D +( 1− e a)E(1 − θ) − I0 − I1 =0 .
Assuming there exists e a so that14
δ
1 − δ
[V (e a)) − V NE] ≥ [(1 − θ)RE(aNE(θ) − e a) − (c(aNE(θ)) − c(e a)],




[V (a∗(δ))) − V NE]=[ ( 1− θ)RE(aNE(θ) − a∗ (δ)) − (c(aNE(θ)) − c(a∗ (δ))].
We will then have
Proposition 6 If a∗(δ) ≤ aNE¡
θ
¢
, the best lending relationship when 1 holds has a(θ)=a∗(δ) for all θ.
The interpretation is straightforward. The choice of a∗(δ) is the one that gets the relationship, when
constrained to have an impatient entrepreneur, closer to what would be the “unconstrained” optimal lending
relationship.
I tr e m a i n st oa n s w e rw h a tt od oi fa∗(δ) >a NE(θ). F o rs u c hc a s e ,f o rs o m es u b s e t[θ
0,θ], one would have
a∗(δ) >a NE(θ) >afor θ ∈ [θ
0,θ]. Therefore, the adoption of a∗(δ) for those projects would involve getting
further away from the unconstrained optimum. An alternative would be to allow that types in [θ
0,θ] to
14If there is no such a0, then there exists a θ0 ≤ θ such that all action schedules that can possibly prevail must equal the
Static Nash one for [θ,θ0].
17take their static best action. However, although by making the action taken by these types closer to a, a
beneﬁt is attained, the fact that aNE(.) is strictly decreasing would impose — through a reduction in the
informational rents provided to types below θ, and through a higher premium for reﬁn a n c i n g—ac o s tt ot h e
relationship. The best way to reconcile the need to move closer to the unconstrained optimum a(θ)=a
with an action schedule which does not allow for the use of the entrepreneur’s private information against
the bank is through a step function.




calls for the adoption of a







into ﬁnite intervals {Ai}
N
i=1 such that, at an optimal lending relationship,
a(θ)=ai if θ ∈ Ai.
The presence of an impatient entrepreneur hinders the lending relationship if it calls for an action which
is too close to the Bank’s most preferred one. In such a case, when facing a project which is likely to need
reﬁnancing, the entrepreneur will be tempted to renege on the implicit contract he holds with the bank.
In response to that, the required action will be adjusted toward one which is closer to the entrepreneur’s
static best action. Propositions 6 and 7 show that it will remain true, however, that the entrepreneur will
be called, to the extent of what is feasible, to commit toward not using his private information against the
bank.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We considered a model in which repeated lending plays a disciplinary role in a setting with incomplete
contracts. Our main results are as follows. Under a one-shot interaction (arm’s length ﬁnancing), given the
lack of contractibility, the bank charges up-front a premium whenever a contract that prescribes reﬁnancing.
As a consequence, projects that would be reﬁnanced in a complete contract world will be shut down.
Repeated lending aligns the interests between lenders and borrows, allowing for reﬁnancing of all projects.
On the equilibrium path, the optimal lending relationship is stationary: following any action prescribed
to be taken by the entrepreneur in equilibrium, he is promised the highest possible continuation values.
Oﬀ-equilibrium, the entrepreneur gets the lowest possible continuation value; the one associated with the
indeﬁnite repetition of arm’s length contracting. Along with reﬁnancing being granted to all projects, the
fact that the entrepreneur is promised the highest possible continuation values at each period implies that the
implicit contract between the lender and the entrepreneur satisﬁes a strong form of renegotiation-proofness:
current (as all projects are reﬁnanced) as well as future (as only the highest continuation value is promised
to the entrepreneur) eﬃciency is attained.
A robust feature of an optimal lending relationship is that the action schedule (as a function of project
types) adopted by the entrepreneur is either a constant or a step function. Hence, the bank imposes to
the entrepreneur a ﬁnite set of decisions from which he can pick his action, bounding his discretion over
decisions.
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6 Appendix A: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :For any v in T (W), there must exists contracts, an action schedule, and {w(θ)}θ ⊂ W
so that
U(θ)=( 1− δ)u(a(θ),D,x;θ)+δw(a(θ)) ≥ (1 − δ)u(a(b θ),D,x;θ)+δw(a(b θ)).
Standard Envelope Theorem arguments (Milgrom and Segal [2002]) along with the fact that the entre-





x[(a(e θ)RE] − [R − D]
´
de θ, and (Envelope)
x(a(θ)) is decreasing in θ.
Taking the expectation of U(θ) — using integration by parts —, one has that
















20Proof of Lemma 2: Fix a compact W, and let {vn} be a sequence in T(W). We need to show that there
exists a subsequence of {vn} which has a limit in T (W).
From the deﬁnition of T(W), there exists {wn(.),D n,x n,a n(.)} so that
1. vn =( 1− δ)u(an(θ),D n,x n;θ)+δwn(an(θ)) + (1 − δ)E[xn[an(θ)RE] − [R − Dn])
F(θ)
f(θ)],
2. xnan(θ) decreasing in θ for all n and xn and Dn so that the Bank’s proﬁts are zero, and


















⎠ ≥ (1 − δ)u(a0,D n,x n;θ)+δwn (a0).
Note that, since W is compact, and wn(an(θ)) is a sequence of real numbers in W, there exists a sub-
sequence of wn(an(θ)) which converges. By exactly the same reason, for a ﬁxed a0, there exists a subse-
quence of wn (a0) which converges. Moreover, as xnan(θ) is an uniformly bounded, decreasing function,
by Helly’s Selection Theorem (Kolmogorov and Fomin, 1970, p. 373), there exists a subsequence of which
converges to a non-increasing function xa(.). For each n, Dn, and xn are sequences of real numbers in a



























converges to (1 − δ)u(a(θ),D,x;θ)+δw(a(θ)). Moreover, since {ank(.)}
nk is uniformly bounded, one can
pick a large, but ﬁnite, positive number c such that
[x[ank(θ)RE] − [R − Dnk]]
F(θ)
f(θ)
is also uniformly bounded by cRE
1
f(θ).S i n c e cRE
1
f(θ) is integrable, one has, by Lebesgue’s Dominated
Convergence Theorem,
E[xnk[ank(θ)RE] − [R − Dnk])
F(θ)
f(θ)




The above shows that {vnk}k converges. Deﬁne its limit by v, it clearly satisﬁes the condition of Lemma
1.


















⎠ ≥ (1 − δ)u(a0,D n,x n;θ)+δwn (a0).
Moreover, along subsequences, the terms on the left hand side and on the right hand side converge (for
the term on the left hand side, we again make use of the Dominated Convergence Theorem). Taking limits














⎠ ≥ (1 − δ)u(a0,D,x;θ)+δw(a0).
Hence, v is in T (W)¥.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Take a compact set V0 ⊂ < such that
V ⊂ V0,
and
T (V0) ⊂ V0.
Deﬁne the decreasing (in the order induced by ⊆) sequence {Vn}n≥1 recursively as follows
Vn = T (Vn−1) ⊂ Vn−1.
The limit of this sequence is the largest ﬁxed point of T (.), which is V. Since T (.) preserves compactness,
V itself must be compact. Compactness of V implies that, among all PPE payoﬀs (which are elements of
V ), there exists a smallest payoﬀ, v, and a largest payoﬀ, v, as claimed.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :It follows from the discussion in the text.¥
Proof of Proposition 3: By Milgrom and Segal’s Envelope Theorem, (1−δ)u(a(θ),D;θ)+δv(a(θ)) is
almost everywhere diﬀerentiable. Therefore, at each point of diﬀerentiability, one must have,





|e θ=θ =0 .
As
d(1 − δ)u(a(b θ),D;θ)
db θ
|e θ=θ =( 1− δ)[(1 − θ)REx − c0(a(θ))]a0(θ),
the sign of
dδv(a(θ))
de θ |e θ=θ will depend on how a(θ) compares to the action taken in the Static Nash Equilibrium.
Consider the case in which, for an open set of θ
0s, say (θ∗,θ
∗) ⊂ [θ,θ], for which the derivative holds
δ
dv(a(θ))
de θ |e θ=θ > 0 .15 The text shows that, by replacing the prescribed actions a(θ) by E(a(θ)|θ ∈ (θ∗,θ
∗))
for all θ over that set, and keeping the prescribed actions the same for all other θ, and improvement can be
made.








we show that there exists feasible continuation values e v(.) that make e a(θ) incentive compatible. (For
what follows, and to save on notation, we express both e v(.) and v(.) — the original continuation values
(that is, the ones that guarantee that a(.) is incentive compatible) — as solely functions of the entrepreneurs’
announcements).






∗)) − a(τ)]dτ ≤ 0.
Deﬁne the continuation values e v(.) as follows:
• for all θ ∈ [θ
∗,θ], let e v(θ)=v(θ).
• for θ ∈ (θ∗,θ
∗), let





∗)) − a(τ)]dτ −
(1 − δ)[(1 − θ)RE[E(a(θ)|θ ∈ (θ∗,θ
∗)) − a(θ)] − c(a(θ)) + c(E(a(θ)|θ ∈ (θ∗,θ
∗)).
• ﬁnally, for θ ≤ θ∗ we let
δe v(θ)=δv(θ)+( 1− δ)RE∆.
One can readily see that such continuation values guarantee that, given the new action proﬁle, which is non-
increasing, truthtelling is optimal for the entrepreneur. In fact, this is so because those continuation values
were constructed so that the integral formula implied by the Envelope Theorem (the equation (Envelope) in
the proof of Lemma 1) holds.
Moreover, for all θ, e v(θ) ≤ v, so that the new continuation values are feasible. Indeed, (i) for all θ ∈ [θ
∗,θ],
these values are feasible as they are exactly equal to the previous ones which are feasible by assumption, (ii)
for all θ ≤ θ∗, they are also feasible as they are equal to the previous continuation values added to a negative
number. Finally, since for all θ in (θ∗,θ
∗),v 0(θ) < 0, for all such θ i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tv(θ) is bounded
away from v.B yp i c k i n gθ∗, and θ
∗ close enough from each other, using the continuity of the integral with
respect to its bounds and the continuity of
REa − c(a)
in a, e v(θ) is feasible for such θ
0s as well.
If ∆ ≥ 0, we can proceed in a slightly diﬀerent way. If θ ∈ [θ,θ∗], the continuation values are kept the





the new continuation values are equal to the previous ones minus ∆. For the remaining
cases, the continuation values are similar to the ones constructed above. It can be easily shown that, such
continuation values are feasible, and that the integral formula implied by the Envelope Theorem will hold
with these continuation values, but now the "reference" type will be θ. More precisely, the following will
hold











This along with the fact that e a(θ) is non-increasing will imply Incentive Compatibility.
The discussion just shows that non-constant diﬀerentiable continuation values cannot be optimal.
Consider now the possibility of v(.) jumping at some θ
0. If that is the case, there is a positive measure
set [θ∗,θ
∗] ⊂ [θ,θ] and a θ
0 in the interior of [θ∗,θ
∗] for which θ ≤ θ
0 implies that v(θ)=v∗ and θ>θ
0
23implies that v(θ)=v∗, with v∗ <v ∗ ≤ v. This can only be Incentive Compatible if a(θ)=a∗ for θ ≤ θ
0 and
a(θ)=a∗ for θ>θ
0, with a∗ >a ∗ (if the actions taken were the same, and the continuation values were
diﬀerent, an entrepreneur with θ ≤ θ
0 would be strictly better oﬀ announcing b θ>θ
0). As in the text, if one
substitutes a(θ) by E(a(θ)|θ ∈ [θ∗,θ
∗]) for all θ over that set and make a strict improvement in the objective.
If there is  >0 so that v∗ <v ∗ ≤ v − , the same continuation values constructed for the diﬀerentiable case
would do the job of making the change incentive compatible.
Otherwise, that is, when v∗ = v, replace a(θ) by
e a(θ;α)=
(
(1 − α)a(θ)+αE(a(θ)|θ ∈ [θ∗,θ




By the standard reasons, for any 1 >α>0, such replacement, if incentive compatible, will improve the






[e a(θ;α) − a(τ)]dτ ≤ 0. for all α,
and consider: e v(θ;α)=v(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ
∗,θ],
δe v(θ;α)=δv(θ)+( 1− δ)RE
θ∗ Z
θ
[e a(θ;α) − a(τ)]dτ
−(1 − δ)[RE(1 − θ)[e a(θ;α) − a(θ)] − c(a(θ)) + c(e a(θ;α)).
for θ ∈ [θ∗,θ
∗] and, ﬁnally,
δe v(θ;α)=δv(θ)+( 1− δ)RE e ∆(α) for θ<θ ∗.
Clearly, whenever θ ∈ [θ,θ∗) ∪ [θ
∗,θ], continuation values are feasible.




, as v(θ)=v∗ <v ∗ = v, by continuity, δe v(θ;α) is feasible for α close enough to
zero.
We will now show that, by choosing θ∗ and θ
∗ properly,
dδv(θ;α)
dα |α=0 < 0 for the remaining cases. Hence,









∗)) − a(τ)]dτ −







, this expression reads
(1 − δ)RE[θ
∗ − θ](E(a(θ)|θ ∈ (θ∗,θ
∗)) − a∗])





the sign of this expression is the same as the sign of
RE[θ
∗ − θ] − [RE(1 − θ) − c0(a∗)]
Noting that a∗ is bounded away from above by aNE(θ
0)16,there is a ς>0 so that
[RE(1 − θ) − c0(a∗)] >ς
for θ close enough to θ
0.
Hence, one can pick θ
∗ close enough to θ
0 and make
dδv(θ;α)
dα |α=0 < 0. Hence, those continuation values
induce truthtelling when the relevant action schedule is e a(θ) and are feasible for α close enough to zero. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :In the text.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :We proceed in a couple of steps.





Proof: Since v(θ)=v for all θ, incentive compatibility in such a case is equivalent to









is aNE(θ), which is the schedule that satisﬁes
[(1 − θ)RE − c0 (a(θ))] = 0.
Consider replacing aNE(θ) by
a1 (θ)=
(











1 close to θ. Ignoring, at ﬁrst, the eﬀect of such a change in type θ’s utility, matters will be
improved. However, a1 (θ) is not incentive compatible as a1 (θ) <a NE¡
θ
1¢
so that, given the continuity of
aNE(θ) in θ, type θ
1 would be better oﬀ announcing θ
1 − γ rather than θ
1 for γ small enough. To ﬁxt h i s ,
pick θ2 <θ









1)a2RE − c(a2)=( 1− θ
1)REa1 − c(a1).
For θ
1 close to θ,s u c haθ
2 exists as (i) a2 >a NE¡
θ
1¢
>a 1, and (ii) (1−θ
1)REa−c(a) is strictly concave
in a and attains its highest value at aNE¡
θ
1¢
. Replacing a1 (θ) by
a2 (θ)=
(





1 will not have incentives to misreport. Moreover, as for an interval a1 (θ) was replaced by its con-
ditional expected value, there will be an additional gain the objective. However, a2 (θ) is not Incentive
16Otherwise, a type θ = θ0 − γ would be, for γ>0 close enough to zero, strictly better oﬀ by announcing θ0 as (i) it will
allow him to pursue an action that is closer to what is best for him in the stage game (by the continuity of aNE(θ) in θ), and
(ii) grant him the best possible continuation value.
25Compatible: type θ
2 will have an incentive to report θ
2 − γ rather than θ
2 for γ small enough. Once again,
we can ﬁxt h i sb yp i c k i n gθ








2)REa2 − c(a2)=( 1− θ
2)REa3 − c(a3).
For the same reasons as above, such a θ
3 exists, the replacement of a2 (θ) by
a3 (θ)=
(




precludes a deviation from θ
2, and increases the objective function. Proceeding inductively as above, one will
have a sequence of cutoﬀs {θi}
N
i=1 and a corresponding step function aN (θ) which is incentive compatible.




=a r gm a x
a (1 − θ)RE − c(a),
if one picks {θi}
N
i=1 so that θ
1 is close to θ, the resulting loss for type θ coming from the substitution of
aNE(.) by aN (.) will be of second order. As the gains from substituting the action schedule by its mean
value are of ﬁrst order magnitude, the result follows.¥
STEP 2: If a(.) is strictly decreasing for some interval (θ∗,θ
∗), it cannot jump at either θ∗ or θ
∗.
Proof: Under the stated assumption, a(.) has to be equal to aNE(θ) over (θ∗,θ
∗).
If a(.) were to jump at, say, θ∗, there would be ς>0 so that
a(θ∗) ≥ aNE(θ∗)+ς.
Therefore, by continuity of aNE(θ), θ∗ would be better oﬀ announcing θ∗ + γ for for γ small enough.¥
From Step 2, one sees that, if a(.) is strictly decreasing for some interval (θ∗,θ
∗), it must be continuous
at θ∗, and θ
∗.










aNE(θ∗) if θ<θ ∗






Proof: We can apply exactly the same steps as the ones used to proof Step 1 over the set [θ∗,θ
∗], and
make improvements in the components of the objective function related to the informational rents and the
payment to be made by the entrepreneur, D.
Incentive compatibility for types θ
∗ and θ∗ may be violated though. To see why that is the case, consider
the case of type θ
∗. The procedure calls for replacing aNE(θ) over [θ
1,θ









Two remedies can be adopted. First, one could make a(θ)=a1 for all θ>θ
∗. Second, one could make
a(θ)=a0 for θ>θ
∗, where a0 satisﬁes
(1 − θ
∗)RE − c(a1)=( 1− θ
∗)RE − c(a0).
26If one, starting from aNE(θ
















+ RF [1 − F (θ









If (eﬀect) is positive, by picking θ
1 properly, a gain in the objective can be attained by making a(θ)=a0
for θ>θ
∗. If (Eﬀect) is negative, making a(θ)=a1 for all θ>θ
∗ generates a gain.
T h ec a s eo ft y p eθ∗ can be dealt with in an analogous fashion. ¥
Exactly the same steps as the ones in the proof of STEP 3 can be used to show that any IC action schedule
w h i c hi sn o tas t e pf u n c t i o nc a n n o tb eo p t i m a l . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :Clearly among the PPS that have a constant action being taken and that satisfy
the "participation" constraints, the one that has a(θ)=a∗ (δ) for all θ is the best as the optimum calls for
the choice of the smallest action compatible with the constraint associated with observable deviations, which
is a∗ (δ). For any non-constant action, one would be be moving even further away from the unconstrained
optimum.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :Let θ
0 be type for which a∗ (δ)=aNE(θ
0). Consider the following schedule
a0(θ)=
(




This course of action is trivially incentive compatible. Moreover, as for θ>θ
0,a 0(θ) is closer to a than
a∗(δ) it, if feasible, will increase the value of the relationship. To argue that a0(θ) is feasible, one just needs
to show that an observable deviation is not proﬁtable for any type. It trivially holds true for θ>θ
0 as for
those types the action prescribed is the best static one. From the deﬁnition of a∗ (δ)
δ
1 − δ
[V (a∗(δ))) − V NE]=[ ( 1− θ)RE(aNE(θ) − a∗) − (c(aNE(θ)) − c(a∗)].
Since the value of the relationship under a0(θ) is larger — for its closer to the unconstrained optimum —
than V (a∗ (δ)),n ot y p ew i l lw a n tt od e v i a t ef r o ma0(θ).
We have shown that a0 (θ) dominates a∗ (δ). We can now use the same arguments as the ones in the proof
of Proposition 3, and construct a step function which is incentive compatible that improves upon a0(θ).T h e
fact that the constraints that prevent observable deviations slack under a0(θ) will imply that, for a properly
chosen step function, they will also slack under the new schedule.¥
17Note that the two ﬁrst terms are positive, while the second is negative.
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